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III.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is taken from the trial court's memorandum ruling of May 9,2007

and final order and judgment of June 7, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j).
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Must the Citi Appellees have an interest in the liened property to have
standing to contest the validity of the Appellant Victor's lien?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether a given individual or
association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law,
although there may be factual findings that bear on the issue, an appellate court will
review a question of law for correctness.1 An appellate court will review such factual
determinations made by a trial court with deference.2 Because of the important policy
considerations involved in granting or denying standing, an appellate court will
closely review trial court determinations of whether a given set of facts fits the legal
requirements for standing, granting minimal discretion to the trial court. Id. at 938,
939.
PRESERVATION BELOW: The Appellant Victor raised and argued the issue
of the Citi Appellees's standing before the court below. R.256, 257. As well, unless

1

Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997).

2

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
1

a party has standing a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute.
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.3 "[Standing is a
jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied" before a court may entertain a
controversy between two parties.4 " [T]he moving party must have standing to invoke
the jurisdiction of the court."5 Under the traditional test for standing, "the interests
of the parties must be adverse" and "the parties seeking relief must have a legally
protectible interest in the controversy."6
2. Did the Citi Appellees proffer competent evidence that they did not
have timely actual knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether an affidavit proffers facts establishing the
elements necessary to prove a claim or defense is a matter of law which an appellate
court reviews with no deference to the trial court's interpretation.7
PRESERVATION BELOW: The Appellant raised this issue in its memorandum in
support of its motion for new trial (R. 218-220, 258-264).

3

See Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1983).

4

Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, P 6 n.2, 82 P.3d
1125; accord Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188,190 (Utah 1986) ("[Ljack of
standing is jurisdictional.");
'Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)
6

Id. at 1148.

7

See Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, UU7, 8.
2

3. Did the Citi Appellees meet their burden of production on their
summary judgment claims?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a trial court has properly granted
summary judgment is a question of law which an appellate court will review for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court.*
PRESERVATION BELOW: The Appellant raised this issue in its Rule 59
motion ( R. 256-264) and at oral argument.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations that
pertain to this appeal are identified in the Table of Authorities and are fully set forth
in the body of this brief or in the addendum to the brief.
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant Victor Plastering timely filed it lien action to enforce its lien for

stucco work it had performed on the subject property, but did not file a lis pendens
in relation to that lien action. It then filed an amended complaint and with that
amended complaint commenced an in rem proceeding to declare its lien superior to
the Appellee Citi Appellees's alleged mortgage on the liened property. The Citi
Appellees answered, obtained a substitution of Citi Federal Savings Bank for Direct

8

See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922P. 2d 745 (Utah 1996).
3

Mortgage Corporation as a defendant and then moved for summary judgment against
Victor.
However, the Citi Appellees summary judgment papers were totally devoid of
any claim that they had an interest in the liened property. The affidavits filed in
support of that motion for summary judgment failed to allege any such interest and
the Citi Defendants failed to argue that had any interest in the liened property. The
supporting affidavits also failed to provide any factual foundation for their conclusion
that the Citi Appellees were never provided with timely actual knowledge of the
commencement of Victor's lien action. Victor moved to strike those affidavits but
on the same day that Victor filed that motion the the trial court granted the Citi
Appellees summary judgment,
Victor then moved for a new trial and after further briefing and argument on
that motion the trial court denied that motion.
VI.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

April 13, 2004

The Appellant Victor timely filed an action to enforce its
mechanic's lien against property in Utah County. Victor had
stuccoed the house constructed on that property and had not been
paid. R. 6.

February 10, 2006 The trial court granted Victor leave to amend its complaint and

4

include in the amended complaint its in rem claims against
Swanson's lien. R. 72
August 21, 2006

The Appellee Citibank Federal Savings Bank answered Victor's
amended complaint. R. 98

Sept. 28, 2006

Citi Federal Savings Bank was substituted in as a defendant for
Direct Mortgage Corporation. R. 125

October 25, 2006 The Appellee Citimortgage, Inc. answered Victor's amended
complaint. R. 132
Nov. 17, 2006

The Citi Appellees moved for summary judgment but failed to
allege they had any interest in the liened property. R.135, 170173.

Nov. 17, 2006

The affidavits of Jim Beech (R. 142) and Wayne Flynn (R. 138)
are filed. Neither affidavit provides any factual foundation for the
legal conclusion their corporations did not have actual
knowledge.

January 16, 2007 Victor moved to strike the affidavits of Beech and Flynn
(although this motion to strike was entered on the trial court's
docket on January 18, 2007, it was filed on January 16, 2007).
R.221

5

January 16, 2007 The trial court granted the Citi Appellees motion for summary
judgment. R.213
March 7,2007

Victor filed a motion for a new trial on the Citi Appellees motion
for summary judgment, alleging that the court erred in granting
summary judgment to the Citi Appellees because they had failed
to allege an interest in the liened property, had failed to prove a
lack of actual knowledge and had failed to meet their burden of
production on summary judgment. R. 253, 266.

April 16, 2007

Victor's motion is orally argued before the court. R. 394

May 9, 2007

The court issued a memorandum ruling denying Victor's motion
for new trial. R.402

June 7, 2007

Judgment is entered in favor of the Citi Appellees. R.416

June 8, 2007

Victor filed its notice of appeal. R.418

VII.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Regardless of whether any opposition is filed to a summary judgment motion,

unless that motion "is made and supported as provided for by" by Rule 56 Ut. R. Civ.
P. summary judgment cannot be entered against the non-moving party. At summary
judgment the Citi Appellees failed to prove or argue they had an interest in the liened
property. Victor's lien action was in rem against the Citi Appellees and unless they

had an interest in the liened property they could not show a distinct and palpable
injury that gave them an interest in contesting Victor's claim to lien priority. Having
a right to appear in an in rem action is different than a right to defend on the merits
and unless the Citi Appellees had something at stake in the in rem lien action they had
no standing to contest Victor's lien claims. Because the Citi Appellees failed to make
any showing of an interest in the liened property the trial court erred in granting them
summary judgment.
As well, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) only benefit persons
with an interest in the liened property. Unless a peison has an interest in the liened
property, they have no standing to invoke the lis pendens requirements of § 38-111(2). The Citi Appellees failed to show they had an interest in the liened property
and thus excluded themselves from asserting the requirements of § 38-1-11(2) against
Victor.
Finally, regardless of whether the Citi Appellees could put the issue of timely
actual knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action into issue at summary
judgment, they failed to proffer competent evidence on the issue of timely actual
knowledge. Although at trial Victor bears the burden of proof on the issue of actual
knowledge, at summary judgment the Citi Appellees bear the initial burden of
producing evidence showing they did not have timely actual knowledge. The Beech

7

and Flynn affidavits are conclusory in the extreme and provide no supporting factual
foundation for their legal conclusion that the Citi Appellees did not have timely actual
knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action. Without that factual
foundation it is impossible for a trier of fact to determine whether the evidence is
competent; that is, relevant, material and otherwise admissible. And by reciting only
that they did not have "actual knowledge" the Citi Appellees legal conclusion tells
the reader nothing about what the affiants mean by "actual knowledge." At summary
judgment a trial court is not capable of weighing conflicting inferences on material
issues ot tact, and the trial court erred in finding that the Beech and Flynn affidavits
provided competent evidence.
Because the Citi Appellees lacked standing to contest Victor's in rem lien
claims on the merits, lacked standing to invoke the lis pendens requirements of § 381-11(2) and failed to proffer competent evidence on the issue of timely actual
knowledge, the trial court erred in granting the Citi Appellees summary judgment and
Victor is entitled to a reversal of that judgment, and an award of its attorney fees
before this Court and the court below.
VIII. ARGUMENT
A.

The Citi Appellees must have an interest in the liened property to
have standing to contest the validity of the Appellant Victor's lien.
In their summary judgment motion the Citi Appellees's entirely failed to make
8

any assertion that they had a legal or equitable interest in the property which was the
subject of Victor's lien action. R. 135,137,141,157, 160-173. Unless they have an
interest in the subject property they have no standing to contest the priority of
Victor's lien.
i. Unless They Have An Interest In The Liened Property The Citi
Appellees Cannot Invoke The Actual Knowledge Requirement of
§38-1-11(2).
The Citi Appellees cannot look to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) for statutory
standing, because it only requires the recording of "a notice of the pendency of the
action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession of
real property . . ."9 Unless the Citi Appellees had an interest in the subject property
which could affect "the title or right to possession of [that] real property," the Citi
Appellees were not within the class of persons the lis pendens requirement of § 38-111(2) was intended to benefit, which means that by failing to prove they had an
interest in the subject property the Citi Appellees failed to show that they had
standing to claim the benefit of that lis pendens requirement.
In Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.10 the Utah Supreme
Court specifically found that § 38-1-11(2) was only intended to give notice to persons

9

Utah Code Ann. §38-1-11(2).

10

798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990).
9

with an interest in the liened property:
By contrast, it follows logically, timely recordation of the lis pendens
imparts constructive notice to all persons concerned with the property
of the action to enforce the lien, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2(1989),
regardless of whether they were named as parties or had actual
knowledge of the action, [emphasis added]
Thus, unless the Citi Appellees are within the class of persons which can invoke the
lis pendens requirements of § 38-1-11(2), whether or not they had actual knowledge
of Victor's lien action is irrelevant to whether Victor could proceed with its lien
action against the Citi Appellees.
The Projects court's specific reference to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2,11 which
provides for the filing of a lis pendens, confirms that at the time that Victor served the
Citi Appellees they could not invoke the lis pendens requirements of § 38-11-1(2)
unless they had an interest in the liened property. Section 78-40-2 states, in part, that
"a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby shall be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action," confirming that its provisions
are intended to benefit only persons with an interest in the property against which the
lis pendens is filed.
Admittedly, where it is established that a person has an interest in the subject
property and that person challenges Victor's lien, § 38-1-11(3) imposes the burden

11

Amended and re-codified as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303.
10

of proof upon Victor at trial to show actual knowledge. But if, as the Citi Appellees
urge, the scope of § 38-1-11(2) is broadened to include persons without an interest
in the subject property, a lien claimant's action would be subject to intervention by
any stranger to the property who cared to intervene and challenge the action.
For example, suppose a case where a mechanic's lien action is timely
commenced but without the filing of a lis pendens. In that case, can a stranger with
no interest in the real property at issue intervene in the action pursuant to § 38-1-13by asserting that the lien holder did not file a lis pendens and that the stranger never
had actual knowledge on a timely basis of the mechanic's lien action? According to
the Citi Appellees's construction of § 38-1-11(2), because that stranger never had
actual knowledge, they would have statutory standing to intervene in the mechanic's
lien to have it declared void as to them.
Of course, the first question that occurs is whether § 38-1-11(2) was intended
to benefit persons with no interest in the subject property, thus providing the world
with standing to challenge a mechanic's lien that has not been perfected by filing a
lis pendens. Only if the Citi Appellees's construction of § 38-1-11(2) is adopted does
the stranger in the above example have standing under § 38-1-13 to intervene.
The glaring problem with such a construction is that it makes nugatory the
requirement that a lis pendens be recorded so that notice is provided to persons with

11

an interest affecting the title or right to possession of that real property. Instead, the
lis pendens requirement is read down to requiring only the recording of a notice of
a pendency of the action. Under the Citi Appellees's reading as soon as any person
that did not have an interest in the real property (typically all persons in the State of
Utah excepting those few persons with liens or other interests in a particular
residential property) learned of an unperfected lien action, they could intervene and
move to void the unperfected lien as against them. Even if. the lien holder
immediately conceded that the lien was void as against the stranger, the lien holder
would still be liable for the successful mtervenor's attorney fees incurred to file the
motion to intervene. Unless it was the intent of the legislature to open the court's
doors to intermeddlers and vexatious claims, the Citi Appellees's construction cannot
be the construction applied to § 38-1-11(2).
ii. Without An Interest In The Liened Property the Citi
Appellees Lacked Standing To Contest On The Merits
Victor's Lien Claims.
The Citi Appellees's inability to prove any adverse effect from Victor's lien
action is key to showing that under Utah law Citi Appellees lacked standing to seek
relief under § 11(2). Unlike the federal judiciary which is constrained by the Article
III case or controversy clause, in determining whether a litigant has standing Utah
courts focus on the separation of powers doctrine. Standing is a concept ffrooted in

12

the historical and constitutional role of the judiciary" as one of three separate and
equal branches of government. 12 Moreover, "the question of whether a given
individual or association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a
question of law, although there may be factual findings that bear on the issue."13
Under the traditional test for standing, a litigant must demonstrate a "particularized"
injury, which in a lien action can only occur if the named defendant has an interest
in the property. 14
In Utah foreclosure proceedings are in rem15 and the question then arises of
how it is that Citi Appellees, which had no interest in the subject property, can
demonstrate a particularized injury. As to in rem proceedings, the Utah Supreme
Court has approved the classification employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
addressing in rem jurisdiction:
As explained in n. 17 of Shaffer, the Supreme Court there chose to use
the term "in rem" to describe both in rem and quasi in rem jurisdictions.
In quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 78
S. Ct. 1228, n. 12 (1958), the Shaffer Court did acknowledge the
distinctions in these types of jurisdiction. That quote from Hanson

12

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149.

13

Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997).

u

Soc'y of Prof I Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987).

15

See P.LE. Employees Fed Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, FN4 (Utah
1988) where the court ruled: "A proceeding to foreclose upon a mortgage is considered an
action in rem or quasi in rem under Utah law. (citations omitted)."
13

stated:
A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in
designated property. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of
particular persons in designated property. The latter is of two types. In
one the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject
property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar
interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply
what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction
of a claim against him. Restatement, Judgments, 5-9.ffl6
Victor's action against other persons that had or might have an interest in the subject
property was of the first type of quasi in rem proceeding identified in the passage
horn Hanson v. Denckla17 just quoted.
Because the proceeding below was in rem Victor merely sought the
adjudication of the rights (if any) of particular persons in the subject property and did
not claim any personal relief against any of the possible lien holding defendants.
Because this was an in rem proceeding, merely being named as a party defendant did
not provide the Citi Appellees with standing to contest Victor's lien claims on the
merits.18 There was no requirement that Citi Appellees appear and defend on the

16

Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1980).

17

357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958).

18

Cf. United States v. 148,840.00 in United States Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273
(10 Cir. 2008) where the court ruled that at the summary judgment stage of an in rem
proceeding a party making claim to the property in issue must "prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he has a facially colorable interest in the res such that he would be
injured i f deprived of his property interest. Of course, the Citi-Appellees have entirely
failed to prove they have an interest in the liened property.
th

14

merits against Victor's claim. And even when the Citi Appellees chose to appear,
because they had no interest in the subject property they could have no proper interest
in defending against Victor's lien claims, but only in advising the court that they had
no interest in the subject property and that they were was not contesting Victor's
claims.
To have standing under the traditional test Citi Appellees must have shown that
they incurred a "distinct and palpable injury" by alleging that they suffered or will
"sufferf] some distinct and palpable injury that gives [it] a personal stake in the
outcome of the legal dispute."10 The legal dispute between Victor and the Citi
Appellees in this case concerns the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2). The
Citi Appellees entirely failed to prove or argue in their summary judgment papers that
they would suffer some distinct and palpable injury if the requirements of § 11(2)
were not enforced against Victor. Moreover, the Citi Appellees in their summary
judgment papers entirely failed to prove or argue that they had an interest in the
liened property, which conclusively foreclosed any finding by the trial court that the
Citi Appellees suffered a distinct and palpable injury because of a lack of timely
actual knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action.

Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148 (Utah 1983).
15

B.

The Affidavits of Flynn and Beech Fail to Prove the Citi Appellees
Did Not Have Timely Actual Knowledge of Victor's Lien Action.
Before the trial court the Citi Appellees's proffered the affidavits of Wayne

Flynn 20 and Jim Beech21 in support of their claim that the Citi Appellees did not have
timely actual knowledge. But neither of those affidavits provide the proof required
by law. Both affidavits are in a conclusory form and under prevailing case law do not
meet the requirements of Rule 56(e). 22 But even if, for the sake of argument, those
affidavits are deemed admissible as evidence, neither of them disposes of the issue
of actual knowledge.
i. The Conclusory Affidavits of Beech and Flynn Are Devoid of
Factual Foundation And Create Conflicting Inferences On
Material Facts.

20

R. 138.

21

R. 142.

22

See Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp. (In Re General Determination of Water
Rights), 1999 UT 39,1126, where the court reviewed the requirement of Rule 56(e) and
Utah law on this issue:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). These requirements mirror those that apply to
all evidence, and our case law on excluding affidavit evidence supports this.
See, e.g., Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (affidavit
based on unsubstantiated belief insufficient); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d
857, 859 (Utah 1983) (conclusory affidavits are invalid); GNS Partnership
v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affidavits not
based on personal knowledge were properly stricken).
16

As to actual knowledge of persons at Direct Mortgage Corporation Mr. Beech
first avers that he did not have actual knowledge and then finishes with the entirely
conclusory statement that:
Neither affiant nor any other officer or agent of Direct Mortgage
Corporation had actual knowledge of the existence of the abovecaptioned litigation prior to June 14, 2006. R. 137, 11 3.
After reading the Beech affidavit the reader knows no more about whether Direct
Mortgage Corporation had timely actual knowledge than if Mr. Beech had stated "I
deny that Direct Mortgage Corporation had actual knowledge of Victor's lien
litigation prior to Direct Mortgage Corporation being served with process in Victor's
lien action."
Mr. Beech's affidavit is insufficient as proof of a lack of actual knowledge
because it:
i. fails to disclose when Mr. Beech attained his status as an officer of the Direct
Mortgage Corporation (DMC). Did he become President of DMC after April 13,
2004? After June 14, 2006? Although while an officer of DMC he is deemed to have
personal knowledge of DMC s operations within the scope of his duties, the reader
has no way of knowing whether Mr. Beech was an officer of DMC during the first
180 days after April 13,2004. Mr. Beech's failure to disclose these foundational facts
leaves the reader to reasonably infer one of these conflicting assumptions, either of
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which is reasonable.
ii. fails to advise the reader whether the officers and agents referred to include
those employed prior to June 14, 2006. Is Mr. Beech speaking only of officers and
agents while he has been President? Of officers and agents only presently employed
by DMC? He doesn't say, which leaves the reader to infer one of these conflicting
alternatives, any one of which is reasonable.
iii. fails to advise the reader of DMC's operations, functions and transactions
giving rise to an interest in the liened property or of Mr. Beech's duties or functions
within DMC. Is DMC a mere holding company for a subsidiary which in fact
conducted all the operations and transactions relating to the liened property? If so,
this would probably preclude Mr. Beech and DMC's officers and agents from, in the
normal course, acquiring actual knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien
action. Instead, it would be the officers and agents of the subsidiary that would have
the capacity to acquire actual knowledge. Is any such subsidiary an agent of DMC?
Because Mr. Beech does not describe DMC's operations and transactions in relation
to the liened property, we have no way of knowing. Did DMC even have an interest
in the liened property when Victor filed its lien action? Mr. Beech does not say. If
not, had DMC sold its interest and was the person that the DMC mortgage had been
sold to tracking legal actions in relation to the liened property? From the fact that Mr.
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Beech fails to aver that DMC had an interest in the liened property, fails to describe
DMC's operations and transactions which gave rise to an interest in the liened
property, and fails to describe his job duties; the reader could reasonably infer that
DMC was a stranger to the liened property and so did not qualify for notice of
Victor's pending lien action.
iv. fails to advise the reader whether the officers and agents of DMC routinely
reported such lien action information to Mr. Beech, or whether Mr. Beech's
knowledge is based on some other DMC information system. Is Mr. Beech assuming
that because no officer or agent of DMC reported the Victor lien action to Mr. Beech,
none of them had actual knowledge? If DMC does not maintain information systems
to capture this type of lawsuit data, was there some reporting system in place so that
any officer or agent that learned of Victor's lien action would report such information
to Mr. Beech? If not, was inquiry made of the officers and agents of DMC? Did they
respond to that inquiry by affirmatively stating that they were never advised of the
commencement of Victor's lien action or did they merely say they couldn't
remember? Mr. Beech's conclusory affidavit compels the reader to choose among
these conflicting inferences on the issue of actual knowledge.
v. fails to advise the reader whether on or after April 13, 2004 DMC had
information systems in place to capture information relating to the commencement
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of lawsuits naming DMC as a party defendant. Because Mr. Beech makes no mention
of such systems, the reader can reasonably infer that DMC did not have such systems
in place and that Mr. Beech, in effect, is simply asserting that he does not have any
information showing that DMC acquired actual knowledge. This is far different from
a particularized assertion that actual knowledge was never acquired.
vi. fails to advise the reader whether prior to June 14, 2006 the DMC
information systems did in fact capture information regarding Victor's lien action. It
is entirely possible that a clerical employee, who was not an agent or officer of DMC,
routinely entered such information into DMC5s data processing system and that the
responsible officer or agent failed to take proper notice of that information. The
reader is left to speculate whether this was or was not the case.
vii. fails to explain what the term actual knowledge means. Actual knowledge
is a legal term and there is no evidence Mr. Beech is an attorney versed in the
requirements of § 38-1-11(2). Does Mr. Beech mean that DMC must have written
notice? Does he mean that a lack of actual knowledge refers to fact that there is no
data entry on DMC's information systems showing that within 180 days of April 13,
2004 DMC knew that Victor's lien action had been commenced? Does he mean that
he inquired of the persons at DMC responsible for lien actions in which DMC has an
interest and that none of them could remember? Again, Mr. Beech's failure to lay any
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factual foundation for his conclusory statement as to actual knowledge invites
numerous conflicting inferences.
Although Wayne Flynn is employed by Citibank, an entity separate from DMC,
Mr. Flynn's cursory statement on actual knowledge is, excepting for the substitution
of Citibank and a different date, identical to that of Mr. Beech:
Neither Affiant nor any other officer or agent of Citibank had actual
knowledge of the existence of the above-captioned litigation prior to
June 16, 2006. R. 141,113.
Accordingly, the Flynn affidavit suffers from the same defects as the Beech affidavit.
Although the general rule is that corporate otlicers are presumed to have
personal knowledge of the facts to which they attest,23 this only means that a
corporate officer need not testify regarding the sources and means of his knowledge.
But he must still testify as to what it is that he knows. At summary judgment a
corporate officer must nevertheless testify with sufficient particularity to remove
ambiguity regarding what it is that he is saying.
For example, suppose a case of a fraudulent use of an appraisal to over-finance
a property. Although the summary judgment affidavit of a corporate officer
responsible for a mortgage company's real estate financing transactions would not
need to specify the sources and means (i.e., the particular documents and employees
23

See Utah Farm Prod, Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 131 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987) quoting 3
Am. Jur. 2d Affidavits § 5 (1986); cf. Rule 602 URE.
21

providing him with information) by which he acquired knowledge of that fraudulent
transaction, he must still particularize the facts supporting fraud.24 It would not be
enough for him to aver only that: "Ace appraisal colluded with putrid purchaser and
salacious seller to overstate the appraisal, which resulted in the mortgage company
over-financing the property by 30%. The appraiser, the purchase and the seller then
split the excess loan proceeds three ways." Such a conclusory averment provides no
facts disposing of the issues this conclusory statement raises.
Restated, a corporate officer's presumption of personal knowledge cannot
dispose of the requirement that he specifically aver to the facts establishing the
occurrence of the actual transaction in issue.25 Clearly, the presumption of personal
knowledge does not remove the requirement that a corporate officer attest to facts
sufficient to establish the relevance26 and admissibility of the corporate officer's
evidence.27

24

Cf. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 1992) (ruling that even an
expert's affidavit must include not only the expert's opinion, but also specific facts
logically supporting the expert's conclusion).
25

In criminal law, this would be proof of the commission of the actus reus.

26

See URE 401 which states: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
27

3 Am. Jur 2d § 5, FN3 (2003); see also URE 402 which states in part: "Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible."
22

Further, the presumption of personal knowledge cannot operate where
"conflicting inferences material to the outcome of the case can be drawn from the
facts/'28 because at summary judgment there is no way for a trial court to weigh the
evidence and determine which of those conflicting inferences is entitled to the
presumption of personal knowledge. In Goodnow v. Sullivan29 the Utah Supreme
Court considered the inferences drawn by a trial court in relation to a letter in which
the settlor of a trust stated that she did not want the defendant to '"have control over
my property after my death.'" After observing that:
"As a successor trustee, defendant would not have full control over her
mother's property. The 'control' would be shared with plaintiff,"30
the Court then dealt with the unresolved fact questions this generic use of the word
"control" raised:
"The question then arises regarding what Mrs. Morrison meant by
'control.' Was it full control or only partial control? Again, actual
questions of fact are presented."31
After finding that this generic usage raised questions of fact, the Court then
held that:

Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21,1113.
2002 UT at 1112.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted)
23

Various conflicting inferences material to the outcome of the case can
be drawn from the facts. The judge "may not on a motion of summary
judgment, draw fact inferences as to [the moving party's] purpose or
intention.. .. Such inferences may only be drawn at trial.1132
Applied to the case sub judice, it is evident that the Beech and Flynn affidavits leave
unresolved numerous conflicting inferences material to the outcome of this case.
A primary question the Beech and Flynn affidavits leave unresolved is what do
they mean by "actual knowledge." Because they are not lawyers versed in Utah law,
they are not competent to testify whether their respective corporations, in the legal
sense, had actual knowledge.33 Instead, they must testify to those specific events or
transactions which provided their respective corporations with knowledge that they
had not acquired or been informed of the commencement of Victor's lien action.34
Again, although their personal knowledge is presumed so that they do not need state
the sources and means by which they acquired knowledge of those events or
transactions, they must still testify as to particular corporate actions which provided

32

2002 UT 21,1113.

33

See Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) where
this Court rejected as insufficient a legal conclusion in an affidavit:
"However, this affidavit merely states the legal conclusion that the facility
is an accessory use, and as such was exempt from the Development Code's
building permit requirements. It does not set forth specific facts to support
this bare legal conclusion and, therefore, fails to show that there is a
genuine issue for trial."
34

Id.
24

their respective corporations with knowledge they had never acquired or received
information regarding the commencement of Victor's lien action.
If a court is to assess the admissibility of a witness's testimony, that witness
must state sufficient facts to allow a court to assess and weigh the probative value of
the evidence (i.e. its relevance). Unless the affidavit of a corporate officer at least
facially provides some relevant evidence, there is no evidence on which to found
summary judgment. A bare conclusion by a purported witness unsupported by
reference to any facts to support that conclusion, is by definition entirely irrelevant
and cannot dispose of a material fact in issue.35
ii. There Is No Evidence The Citi Appellees Had Any Way
Of Knowing Whether They Timely Acquired Actual
Knowledge Of The Lien Action.
In K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis the Utah Supreme Court overturned summary
judgment because the conclusory affidavit of the moving party's officer was found
to be insufficient to dispose of the issue of actual knowledge.36 At issue was a
provision of the Utah Code which provides that "[a] restriction on transfer of a
security imposed by the issuer" is ineffective against any person without actual

35

SeeAlbrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., 596 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Utah 1979); see
also Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah 1978).
36

888 P.2d 623 (Utah 1994).
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knowledge unless the restriction is conspicuously noted on the security.
The party moving for summary judgment in Koroulis, Montana Brand, failed
to meet its summary judgment burden of establishing it did not have actual
knowledge. Its corporate secretary, Maxfield, averred in his affidavit that "[no one]
at Montana Brand was informed of the existence of the Consent Agreement or the
Stockholders1 Agreement by personnel from First Security [Bank]." In construing
this "carefully tailored affidavit" the court found its did not support summary
judgment because, even though it was coupled with the admission by the non-moving
party Koroulis "that he had never informed Montana Brand about the restiiction" it
did not "foreclose the possibility that Montana Brand acquired actual knowledge of
the restrictions from some other source."38
In denying summary judgment, the court explicitly ruled that unless Montana
Brand, as the moving party, met its initial burden of showing that there were no
disputed issues of material fact, "the party opposing the motion is under no obligation
to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial."39 The moving party's failure
to meet its initial burden meant that the non-moving parties "were under no obligation

37

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-204.

38

Koroulis at 628.

39

Id.
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to come forward with specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial"
In addressing the very issue disputed in this case, which is actual knowledge
of the party moving for summary judgment, Koroulis represents a specific finding
that the party moving for summary judgment failed to prove it did not have actual
knowledge; that is, it failed to prove a negative. In reality, such issues do not really
require proof of a negative, but require affirmative proof of regular procedures to
acquire or receive information.
Professor Wigmore provides considerable instruction on how such proof is to
be provided. The Citi Appellees must describe those events or transactions which
provided them with sufficient opportunity to capture information regarding the
commencement of Victor's lien action within the first 180 days of its
commencement.41 Unless the Citi Appellees have testified to facts showing that they
would have captured this information had it been provided to them,42 they have not
disposed of the issue of actual knowledge.
Professor Wigmore states that the admissibility of this negative fact evidence
turns on whether the witness had sufficient exposure to events so "that in the ordinary

Id.
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 653 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 664 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
27

course of events he would have heard or seen the fact had it occurred."

Consistent

with this rule, our courts require that the witness lay adequate foundation to show
what the ordinary course of events were for that witness.44 In the real estate mortgage
context, this would necessarily require disclosure of the nature of the corporation's
mortgage and recording transactions, its record keeping systems employed to capture
or acquire information, whether those information systems were operating during the
time in question and whether they were designed to capture the type of information
in issue.
Although there are no Utah cases directly on point, Curtis v. Harmon
Electronics, Inc.45 quotes Hudson v. Union Pacific R.R.46 for the rule that:
All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in relation to the
train at the time it is claimed the warnings were given that said warnings
would have awakened her attention to them. [The witness] was in a
position where it is likely that she would have heard the whistle, or at
least the bell, and as there is no evidence that her attention was so
absorbed in other matters that she would not have heard, a jury question
is presented.
Applied to this case, at summary judgment this rule requires that the Citi Appellees

43

Id.

44

See GlencoreLtd. v. Ince, 972 P.2d 376, 381 (Utah 1998) (where the court held
that to provide evidence of what constituted the ordinary course of business, a party must
provide evidence of its business practices).
45

575 P.2d 1044,1047 (Utah 1978).

46

233 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1951).
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show that during the first 180 days after April 13, 2004 their record keeping systems
would have captured any information received regarding the commencement of
Victor's lien action against other encumbrancers on the liened property, that those
record keeping systems were properly functioning during that time, and that within
the first 180 days after April 13, 2004 those record keeping systems did not capture
any information regarding the commencement of Victor's lien action.
As it stands now, the conclusory statements of actual knowledge in the Beech
and Flynn affidavits are just as consistent with the inference that the Citi Appellees
do not have any way of knowing whether the Citi Appellees acquired information
within the first 180 days regarding the commencement of Victor's lien action, as they
are with the inference that the Citi Appellees had systems in place which would have
within the first 180 days acquired that lien action information had it been provided
to them, but that their systems did not acquire any such information. The first
inference is, in effect, that the Citi Appellees do not know whether they timely
acquired information on Victor's lien action. The second inference is that the Citi
Appellees know for a fact that timely information regarding the commencement of
Victor's lien action was not provided to them.
Because these two inferences conflict, because both are material to the outcome
of this case, and because both inferences can be drawn from the conclusory averments
of Beech and Flynn, there was no evidence before the trial court at summary
29

judgment from which it could properly infer a lack of actual knowledge by the Citi
Appellees. The trial court could only find that the affidavits of Beech and Flynn were
sufficient by selecting one conflicting inference over the other, which requires
weighing the evidence. Under the holding stated in Goodnow,41 at summary judgment
it was error for the trial court to make these adverse inferences against Victor.
C.

The Citi Appellees Did Not Meet Their Burden Of Production for
Summary Judgment Against Victor's Lien Claims.
The burden of production on summary judgment is different than the burden

of proof at trial. At trial a plaintiff presents its case in chief and if at the close of that
case if it fails to present a prima facie case, the defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict. But where a defendant is moving for summary judgment a case presents a
fundamentally different procedural posture because it is the defendant, as the moving
party, which must first produce proof sufficient to negate the plaintiffs claims against
the defendant. Regardless of whether a summary judgment motion is opposed, unless
the party moving for summary judgment under Rule 56 presents a prima facie case
supporting its claim to summary judgment, summary judgment is improper.48
47

2002 UT at 1113.

48

See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 922P. 2d 745 (Utah 1996) where the
court ruled: "We find that the manner in which these affidavits were presented
provided an insufficient factual basis for the district court's ruling. Ordinarily, the
opponent to a summary judgment motion must "set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). However, that burden
is triggered only when "a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
30

In this case, a key element of the Citi Appellees summary judgment claim was
never proven by the Citi Appellees because they failed to prove that they had an
interest in the liened property. R. 135,137,141,157, 160-173. If the Citi Appellees
had no interest in the subject property, they had no case for opposing Victor's claim
that its lien was entitled to priority over the Citi Appellees's alleged encumbrance on
the property.
Because the Citi Appellees had no interest in the liened property the only party
with a litigation interest regarding Citi Appellees's alleged encumbrance was Victor.
As explained above, it had an interest in rem to declare Citi Appellees \s lien inferior
to Victor's.
Proof that the Citi Appellees had an interest in the liened property was critical
to their case for summary judgment. In particular, without the predicate showing of

provided in this rule." Id. (emphasis added). "Unless the moving party meets its
initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material
fact exists, 'the party opposing the motion is under no obligation to demonstrate
that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah
1996) (quoting K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994)). The
Madsen affidavit failed to negate any disputed issue regarding the impact of the
change in diversion points on the private wells. Whatever expertise Madsen had
acquired as an irrigator, it was not plainly pertinent to the question of impact on
water tables; nor did he provide any foundational facts supporting his opinion.
See, e.g., King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992)
("Affidavits of experts are insufficient.. . unless foundational facts are set forth
supporting their opinions and conclusions."). Rather, he simply asserted in
conclusory fashion that movement of water upstream could not impact the water
table near plaintiffs' wells.
31

an interest in the property Citi Appellees could not even get to the issue of whether
Victor could show that Citi Appellees had actual knowledge of Victor's lien action.
As has already been shown, unless they had an interest in the liened property they had
no standing to pursue relief under § 38-1-11(2), and any failure by Victor to file a lis
pendens was not something which provided the trial court with jurisdiction to grant
summary judgment to the Citi Appellees.
Moreover, as has been shown above the Citi Appellees failed to prove that they
did not have timely actual knowledge of Victor's lien action. R.137, 141. The fact
that § 38-1-11(3) imposes the burden of proof upon Victor to prove at trial that
Swanson had actual knowledge does not change the nature of a summary judgment
proceeding which requires, by rule, that the moving party "show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."49
Recently, the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the longstanding rule that where
a non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary
judgment must nevertheless present evidence to challenge the non-moving party's
claims and only when the moving party has presented evidence showing that no
material issue of fact exists on the non-moving party's claims are they then required
to proffer evidence establishing a material issue of fact:
49

See Rule 56(c) Ut. R. Civ. P.
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"In this case, Kay had the burden of establishing each element of her
claim that Ray lacked the authority to gift and her claim that Ray
breached his fiduciary duty. In moving for summary judgment on these
claims, the stepchildren had 'the burden of presenting evidence to
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material facts exists and that
judgment as a matter of law is proper."'50
Note that in the Eager case even though the Plaintiff Kay had the burden of proof on
her claim that the gift to the stepchildren was made without authority and in breach
of a fiduciary duty, in moving for summary judgment the defendant stepchildren had
the burden of producing evidence which, prima facie entirely negated Kay's claim;
that is, demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact existed. Accordingly,
even though at trial Victor has the burden of proof under § 38-1-11(3), this does not
relieve the Citi Appellees from their summary judgment burden of proffering
sufficient evidence to prove they had an interest in the liened property and that they
lacked timely actual knowledge.
This Court set the same standard for summary judgment in Kleinert v. Kimball
Elevator Co. where it held that the party defending a summary judgment motion
"need not prove his or her case before the case may be submitted to the jury."51 The
Citi Appellees failure to present any evidence showing they had an interest in the
subject property and their failure to proffer competent evidence to show they lacked

50

Eagar v. Burrows, 2008 UT 42,1115.

51

854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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actual knowledge left Victor's pleadings uncontroverted, meaning that at summary
judgment Victor was never required to submit evidence sufficient to raise a genuine
issue of fact.
IX.

CONCLUSION
The actual knowledge requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) can only

be invoked by a person with an interest in the liened property. The Citi Appellees in
their summary judgment papers entirely defaulted in proving or arguing that they had
any interest in the subject property. Accordingly, the Citi Appellees had no statutory
standing to invoke the actual knowledge requirements of § 38-1-11(2). And
regardless of whether the Citi Appellees has an interest in the subject property, they
failed to proffer competent evidence showing that they did not have timely actual
knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action. At summary judgment the
initial burden was on the Citi Appellees to prove they had an interest in the liened
property and to prove they did not have timely actual knowledge of the
commencement of the lien action. They failed to carry that burden on both counts.
Consequently, it was never incumbent upon Victor to proffer evidence opposing the
Citi Appellees summary judgment motion and the trial court erred in granting the Citi
Appellees summary judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 provides for an award of
attorney fees to the successful party in a contested lien action and Victor requests an
award of attorney fees for its enforcement of its lien against the Citi Appellees, both
34

before this Court and the court below.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2008.
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A. Utah Code Ann. 38-1-11
B. The trial court's May 9, 2007 memorandum ruling.
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Tab A

38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — Action
for debt not affected — Instructions and form
affidavit and motion.
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this
chapter within 180 days from the day on which the lien claimant filed a notice
of claim under Section 38-1-7.
(2) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien
claimant shall file for record with the county recorder of each county in
which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, in the
manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession of real
property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been
made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the
commencement of the action.
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those
claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge.
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any
person to whom a debt may be due for any work done or materials furnished
to maintain a personal action to recover the same.
(4) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of
the residence:
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's
rights under Title 38 ; Chapter 11. Residence Lien Restriction and
Lien Recovery Fund Act; and
(ii) a form affidavit to enable the owner of the residence to specify
the grounds upon which the owner may exercise available rights
under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien
Recovery Fund Act.
(b) The instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a)
shall meet the requirements established by rule by the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(c) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the
residence.
(d) Judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of the owner of
the residence under Title 38, Chapters 1 and 11, and Title 14, Chapter 2,
shall be stayed until after the owner has been given a reasonable period of
time to establish compliance with Subsections 38-ll-204(4)(a) and (4)(b)
through an informal proceeding, as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, commenced within 30 days of the owner
being served summons in the foreclosure action, at the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing and obtain a certificate of compliance or denial of certificate of compliance, as defined in Section
38-11-102.
(e) An owner applying for a certificate of compliance under Subsection
(4)(d) shall send by certified mail to all lien claimants:
(i) a copy of the application for a certificate of compliance; and
(ii) all materials filed in connection with the application.
(f) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall notify
all lien claimants listed in an owner's application for a certificate of
compliance under Subsection (4)(d) of the issuance or denial of a certificate
of compliance.
(5) The written notice requirement applies to liens filed on or after July 1,
2004.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VICTOR PLASTERING, INC.,

MEMORANDUM RULING

Plaintiff,

1

I Date: May 9, 2007
CHRIS A. COLLINS, CHANNA COLLINS, [Case No. 040401255
COBALT HOMES, INC. Dba COBALT
1 Judge Steven L. Hansen
HOMES STYLE BUILDER & COBALT
Division 2
HOMES THE CEDARS L.L.C. dba
COBALT HOMES STYLE BUILDERS,
| BRIAN K. BRADY, MASCO
1 CONTRACTORS SERVICES, DIRECT
MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS
COMPANY, SWANSON BUILDING
MATERIALS, INC., DAVE'S QUALITY
ROOFING, INC., CITIBANK FEDERAL
SAVINGS BANK and JOHN DOES 1
through 10,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs motion to strike the Affidavits of
Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech; Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on Defendant Citibank and
Citimortgage's motion for summary judgment; and Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on
defendant Swanson 's motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On January 16, 2007, this Court issued a memorandum decision granting defendants
CitiMortgage and Citibank Federal Savings Bank's unopposed Motion for Summary
Judgment.

This Court found that because Plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens in this

402

matter and to name Defendants as parties to this lawsuit within 180 days of Plaintiff s
notice of claim of lien, and because Defendants had no actual knowledge of the lawsuit
prior to June 2006 (within the 180 day statutory period), the lien was void as to the
Defendants CitiMortgage and Citibank.
2.

On February 15, 2007, this Court granted defendant Swanson Building Material, Inc.'s
Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact that Plaintiff did not name Swanson in
its initial complaint and failed to do so until nearly two years after recording notice of its
claim of lien and also because that Plaintiff had failed to meet its statutory burden to
prove that Swanson had actual knowledge of the lawsuit during the relevant time frame.
DISCUSSION
In regard to Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendants CitiMortgage and

Citibank ("Citi-Defendants"), Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in granting summary judgment
because the Citi-Defendants provided defective affidavits that are inadmissible that would
preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff did not oppose the affidavits or the summary judgment
until the current motion, after summary judgment had already been awarded.
Plaintiff argues that in the affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech, do not show how
Beech or Flynn were qualified to aver that they knew that the officers and agents of their
respective businesses had no knowledge of the current litigation.
Affidavits must meet the standards as set forth in Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 56(e) states that affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
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such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
In the affidavit of Jim Beech, he swears that he is the president of Direct Mortgage
Corporation and that he first learned of the existence and pendency of the current litigation at the
time Direct Mortgage Corporation was served process on June 14, 2006. He further swears, that
neither he or any other officer or agent of Direct Mortgage Corporation had actual knowledge of
the existence of the current litigation until June 14, 2006.
Plaintiff argues that in the case of K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d 623 (Utah 1994), the
Court found improper a Trial Court's consideration of an affidavit of a secretary on a summary
judgment where he stated the affidavit in that case of a secretary who claimed that to the best of
his knowledge neither he nor anyone at his company had actual knowledge of the Consent
Agreement or the Stockholder's Agreement.
However, Citi-Defendants argue and this Court agrees that on a motion for summary
judgment when an opposing party fails to move to strike defective affidavits, he is deemed to
have waived his opposition to whatever evidentiary defects may exist. See Franklin Financial v.
New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). Because Plaintiff failed to
move to strike defective affidavits on summary judgment they were waived by Plaintiff and were
properly considered by the Court.
Rule 56(e) clearly states:
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Because Plaintiff did not object to the affidavits any evidentiary defects are deemed
waived and the Court takes the affidavits as undisputed fact. Under Rule 56(e) where there is no
genuine issues of fact that any officer or agent of the Citi-Defendants had knowledge of this
current litigation, this Court properly granted summary judgment to the Citi-Defendants.
Therefore, based on the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on the Citi
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. Because the Plaintiff did not move to
strike the affidavits on motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff may not move to strike the
affidavits post-judgment, so the Plaintiffs motion to strike affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim
Beech is also denied.
In regard to Swanson, this Court finds that Swanson was not sent the ruling that was
issued by the Court on February 15, 2007. This Court finds that Swanson made a good faith
effort to see if a ruling had been issued when Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial against
Defendant Swanson, by checking the Court docket. Therefore under Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure this Court allows and considers Swanson's second memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiffs motion.
In Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendant Swanson, Plaintiff argues 5 points:
1) There is no evidence to support the Court's finding that the defendant Swanson was an
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interested party; 2) The Court erred in ruling that the lapse of the Defendant Swanson's lien was
immaterial to the summary judgment issues before this Court; 3) The Court erred in ruling that'
Defendant Swanson's failure to plead the statute of limitation did not result in a waiver of that
defense; 4) The Court erred in ruling that the Plaintiffs failure to file a lis pendens within 180
days of the filing of the mechanic's lien is jurisdictional as opposed to failure to file a legal
action on the lien within 180 days and; 5) The Court erred in law in reversing the burden of
production in a summary judgment proceeding requiring the Plaintiff rather than Swanson to
dispose of the material issue of fact as to whether Swanson had actual knowledge of the
commencement of the within action.
On February 3, 2006, Plaintiff amended their complaint stating that all Defendants, "hold
some claim of right, title, or interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that
all of the claims of right, title or interest of each of theses Defendants and all persons claiming
by, through, or under them, are junior, inferior, and subject to the prior claims and interest of
PLAINTIFF, or that the claims, if any, of any other person or entity (Doe Defendants) who may
assert an interest in the properties should be litigated herein and priorities established." Under
Baldwin v. Vanatage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984), "An admission of fact in a pleading
is a judicial admission and is normally conclusive on the party making it." This Court finds that
Plaintiff sued Swanson and Plaintiff cannot claim now that Swanson has no interest and standing
and cannot respond to the complaint. For the same reasons this Court finds it immaterial that
Swanson's prior lien has lapsed.
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Plaintiff also asserts that because Swanson did not assert the statute of limitations of the
lien in its answer that Swanson waived its statute of limitations defense. However, this Court
finds that the statute of limitations does not apply in this case.
A party failing to comply with §38-1-11 of the mechanics' lien statute is not subject to
waiver, but is jurisdictional. See Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798
P.2d 738 (1990).
This Court stands by its two prior rulings. The burden of proof is on the Plaintiff to show
that the Plaintiff is entitled to the lien and has complied with the lien statute §38-1-11. Both CitiDefendants and Swanson filed motions for summary judgment based on the fact that they did not
have actual knowledge of the current litigation or the lien and that the amended complaint
naming the Defendants was filed 180 days after the lien was filed. Defendants Swanson and
Citi-Defendants filed unopposed affidavits stating that no officers or agents at the respective
businesses had any knowledge of the current litigation. Defendants did not have to prove that
they had an interest in the property as Plaintiff brought the Defendants into the lawsuit creating
an affirmative interest.
Plaintiff attempts to object to the affidavits post-judgment, but that right to objection has
been waived. Based on the above facts the motion for a new trial with Defendant Swanson is
denied.
Defendants to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.
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DATED this
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day of May, 2007.

Stevefi L. Hansen
District Court Judge
Case No. 040401255
A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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Arnold Richer
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Robert W. Harrow
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901 West Baker Drive
South Jordan, Utah 84095
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Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs motion to strike the Affidavits of
Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech; Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on Defendant Citibank and
Citimortgage's motion for summary judgment; and Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on
Defendant Swanson 's motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On January 16, 2007, this Court issued a memorandum decision granting defendants
CitiMortgage and Citibank Federal Savings Bank's unopposed Motion for Summary
Judgment.

This Court found that because Plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens in this
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matter and to name Defendants as parties to this lawsuit within 180 days of Plaintiff s
notice of claim of lien, and because Defendants had no actual knowledge of the lawsuit
prior to June 2006 (within the 180 day statutory period), the lien was void as to the
Defendants CitiMortgage and Citibank.
2.

On February 15, 2007, this Court granted defendant Swanson Building Material, Inc.'s
Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact that Plaintiff did not name Swanson in
its initial complaint and failed to do so until nearly two years after recording notice of its
claim of lien and also because that Plaintiff had failed to meet its statutory burden to
prove that Swanson had actual knowledge of the lawsuit during the relevant time frame.
DISCUSSION
In regard to Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendants CitiMortgage and

Citibank ("Citi-Defendants"), Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in granting summary judgment
because the Citi-Defendants provided defective affidavits that are inadmissible that would
preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff did not oppose the affidavits or the summary judgment
until the current motion, after summary judgment had already been awarded.
Plaintiff argues that in the affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech, do not show how
Beech or Flynn were qualified to aver that they knew that the officers and agents of their
respective businesses had no knowledge of the current litigation.
Affidavits must meet the standards as set forth in Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 56(e) states that affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
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such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
In the affidavit of Jim Beech, he swears that he is the president of Direct Mortgage
Corporation and that he first learned of the existence and pendency of the current litigation at the
time Direct Mortgage Corporation was served process on June 14, 2006. He further swears, that
neither he or any other officer or agent of Direct Mortgage Corporation had actual knowledge of
the existence of the current litigation until June 14, 2006.
Plaintiff argues that in the case of K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d 623 (Utah 1994), the
Court found improper a Trial Court's consideration of an affidavit of a secretary on a summary
judgment where he stated the affidavit in that case of a secretary who claimed that to the best of
his knowledge neither he nor anyone at his company had actual knowledge of the Consent
Agreement or the Stockholder's Agreement.
However, Citi-Defendants argue and this Court agrees that on a motion for summary
judgment when an opposing party fails to move to strike defective affidavits, he is deemed to
have waived his opposition to whatever evidentiary defects may exist. See Franklin Financial v.
New Empire Development Company. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). Because Plaintiff failed to
move to strike defective affidavits on summary judgment they were waived by Plaintiff and were
properly considered by the Court.
Rule 56(e) clearly states:
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Because Plaintiff did not object to the affidavits any evidentiary defects are deemed
waived and the Court takes the affidavits as undisputed fact. Under Rule 56(e) where there is no
genuine issues of fact that any officer or agent of the Citi-Defendants had knowledge of this
current litigation, this Court properly granted summary judgment to the Citi-Defendants.
Therefore, based on the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on the Citi
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. Because the Plaintiff did not move to
strike the affidavits on motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff may not move to strike the
affidavits post-judgment, so the Plaintiffs motion to strike affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim
Beech is also denied.
In regard to Swanson, this Court finds that Swanson was not sent the ruling that was
issued by the Court on February 15, 2007. This Court finds that Swanson made a good faith
effort to see if a ruling had been issued when Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial against
Defendant Swanson, by checking the Court docket. Therefore under Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure this Court allows and considers Swanson's second memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiffs motion.
In Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendant Swanson, Plaintiff argues 5 points:
1) There is no evidence to support the Court's finding that the defendant Swanson was an
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interested party; 2) The Court erred in ruling that the lapse of the Defendant Swanson's lien was
immaterial to the summary judgment issues before this Court; 3) The Court erred in ruling that
Defendant Swanson's failure to plead the statute of limitation did not result in a waiver of that
defense; 4) The Court erred in ruling that the Plaintiffs failure to file a lis pendens within 180
days of the filing of the mechanic's lien is jurisdictional as opposed to failure to file a legal
action on the lien within 180 days and; 5) The Court erred in law in reversing the burden of
production in a summary judgment proceeding requiring the Plaintiff rather than Swanson to
dispose of the material issue of fact as to whether Swanson had actual knowledge of the
commencement of the within action.
On February 3, 2006, Plaintiff amended their complaint stating that all Defendants, "hold
some claim of right, title, or interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that
all of the claims of right, title or interest of each of theses Defendants and all persons claiming
by, through, or under them, are junior, inferior, and subject to the prior claims and interest of
PLAINTIFF, or that the claims, if any, of any other person or entity (Doe Defendants) who may
assert an interest in the properties should be litigated herein and priorities established." Under
Baldwin v. Vanatage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984), "An admission of fact in a pleading
is a judicial admission and is normally conclusive on the party making it." This Court finds that
Plaintiff sued Swanson and Plaintiff cannot claim now that Swanson has no interest and standing
and cannot respond to the complaint. For the same reasons this Court finds it immaterial that
Swanson's prior lien has lapsed.
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Plaintiff also asserts that because Swanson did not assert the statute of limitations of the
lien in its answer that Swanson waived its statute of limitations defense. However, this Court
finds that the statute of limitations does not apply in this case.
A party failing to comply with §38-1-11 of the mechanics' lien statute is not subject to
waiver, but is jurisdictional. See Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798
P.2d 738 (1990).
This Court stands by its two prior rulings. The burden of proof is on the Plaintiff to show
that the Plaintiff is entitled to the lien and has complied with the lien statute §38-1-11. Both CitiDefendants and Swanson filed motions for summary judgment based on the fact that they did not
have actual knowledge of the current litigation or the lien and that the amended complaint
naming the Defendants was filed 180 days after the lien was filed. Defendants Swanson and
Citi-Defendants filed unopposed affidavits stating that no officers or agents at the respective
businesses had any knowledge of the current litigation. Defendants did not have to prove that
they had an interest in the property as Plaintiff brought the Defendants into the lawsuit creating
an affirmative interest.
Plaintiff attempts to object to the affidavits post-judgment, but that right to objection has
been waived. Based on the above facts the motion for a new trial with Defendant Swanson is
denied.
Defendants to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.

6

DATED this

£

ft
. day of May, 2007.
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Case No. 040401255
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